How we understand cosmology was altered by the development of Special and General Relativity. Here, I want to discuss a less appreciated change I think SR introduced to cosmology. In Aristotelian or Thomistic cosmology, there are two kinds of causal series, i.e., accidentally and essentially ordered causal series, and both Aquinas and Aristotle thought that … Continue reading If Einstein was right, there are no essentially ordered causal series
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Visiting Einstein’s Princeton
I am currently a faculty member at a public university in Virginia. However, my family lives in Western New York State. Princeton, New Jersey, is just about halfway between my current home and my family. For that reason, I've made several trips through Princeton -- in December 2024, January 2025, and -- most recently -- … Continue reading Visiting Einstein’s Princeton
Reply to Rasmussen on a “new” infinitary paradox
Josh Rasmussen has recently offered a "new" infinitary paradox on his blog. Josh is consistently wonderful to interact with; I deeply admire the patience and charity he extends to his interlocutors and it's something that I work on (but rarely succeed at) emulating myself. Josh doesn't seem to be completely convinced by his new paradox … Continue reading Reply to Rasmussen on a “new” infinitary paradox
Global Hyperbolicity, Time Travel, and the A-Theory of Time
According to the A-theory of time, there are three monadic and irreducible temporal properties: pastness, presentness, and futurity. Among other things, this means that there's a distinguished present -- where time passes -- and this distinguished present is usually understand to spread across the entire universe. A-theorists typically think that there's a fact about what's … Continue reading Global Hyperbolicity, Time Travel, and the A-Theory of Time
Hobbes’s Defense of the Causal Principle
This is the first post in what will hopefully be a series on the history of the Causal Principle (CP), i.e., that anything that begins to exist has a cause. Today, the principle is most frequently discussed in connection with the Kalam Cosmological Argument, where the CP appears as a premise, and in Hume scholarship. … Continue reading Hobbes’s Defense of the Causal Principle
The Kalam Argument & Free-Will
According to the first stage of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), P1. Anything that begins to exist has a cause. P2. The Universe began to exist. C. So, the Universe has a cause. KCA proponents typically proceed to a second stage, where they argue that the cause of the Universe must be God, who, they … Continue reading The Kalam Argument & Free-Will
Some thoughts on a contingency argument
Cameron Bertuzzi has recently shared the following Argument for God from Contingency to the Capturing Christianity Facebook page: (1) For any contingent thing or group of things, there is an explanation of the fact that it (or they) exists. (2) Considering all the contingent things that exist, if there is an explanation for those things, … Continue reading Some thoughts on a contingency argument
Van Inwagen on the Kalam Argument
https://youtube.com/shorts/9J0gh5p_wI0?si=Vwtqh1crGcT4z9hN In a recent interview, Peter van Inwagen -- one of the foremost Christian metaphysicians in current philosophy -- has called Craig's a priori version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument "utterly depressing". I have looked for -- and have not found -- a place where van Inwagen responds to Craig (or other KCA proponents) in … Continue reading Van Inwagen on the Kalam Argument
Bertrand Russell and Infinite Causal Series
A number of different cosmological arguments -- such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument, the contingency argument, Aquinas's First Mover argument, etc -- rely on a sub-argument that attempts to establish that there are no infinite causal chains. Let's call the principle that there are no infinite causal chains no-infinite-causal-chains. And many cosmological arguments rely on … Continue reading Bertrand Russell and Infinite Causal Series
Daniel Linford 